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the game for many Western states. This article uses focus group data to explore the 
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Introduction 
The deteriorating public finances of many Western states were brought into sharp 
focus following the 2008 global financial crisis. With the culmination of both long-
tend trends and short-term effects, many fiscal deficits widened and sovereign debt 
swelled (Thompson 2013). The shift from a financial crisis to a debt crisis (Blyth 2013, 
Hay 2013), in which these issues climbed and eventually topped the political agenda, 
put considerable pressure on some indebted states to intervene. By 2010, many of 
these troubled states – which included France, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, 
and the UK, among others – responded to this pressure with clear and bold plans for 
fiscal consolidation. Although the specific plans differed in their composition and 
autonomy, this turn to ‘austerity’ was centred upon implementing tax rises and 
spending cuts in the name of short-term deficit reduction and long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
The politics of fiscal consolidation are potentially perilous. Politicians are under 
pressure to credibly commit to fiscal responsibility through implementing potentially 
unpopular policies while also ensuring their own survival at the ballot box (Posner and 
Blöndal 2012, 12). These political dynamics can also be contextualised in regards to 
funding the state – and the continued legitimation of fiscal relations. States depend on 
extracting relatively large sums from citizens and other taxpayers in order to function. 
Since taxes are a set of ‘obligations to contribute money or goods to the state in 
exchange for nothing in particular’ (Martin et al. 2009, 2), ensuring the legitimacy of 
these relations is both difficult and of crucial importance. The post-2008 turn to fiscal 
consolidation raises an interesting puzzle in this respect: when ostensibly imposing 
losses on domestic populations via tax rises and spending cuts, how is fiscal 
consolidation legitimated? 
The literature on post-2008 fiscal consolidation has typically avoided this puzzle to 
date. One prominent strand of the literature puzzles over whether fiscal consolidation 
works, when – if at all – it should be applied, and how it should be used when 
necessary (e.g. Hay 2013; Konzelmann 2014). A similar and overlapping strand 
analyses (and often critiques) the economic ideas used to justify fiscal consolidation (e.g. 
Lysandrou 2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2014). Combining these two strands, Mark 
Blyth (2013) argues that fiscal consolidation is based on a premise that severely 
misdiagnoses what went wrong, an idea that has no substantive theoretical 
underpinning, and a strategy that has never worked in conditions akin to the 
contemporary global economy. While this literature analyses fiscal consolidation 
through a macroeconomic lens, there is another prominent strand that consider fiscal 
relations at the heart of austerity. These scholars pose important macro-level questions 
about the democratic implications of austerity (e.g. Schäfer and Streeck 2013). These 
analyses are sometimes situated within the context of previous attempts at 
consolidation (e.g. Dellepiane-Avellaneda and Hardiman 2015) or within tensions in 
an evolving democratic capitalism (e.g. Streeck 2014). However, legitimation is not 
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directly confronted. A micro-level or everyday approach to fiscal relations – in which 
questions of legitimation are typically foregrounded (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007, 13-
15) – is an appropriate starting point for confronting this puzzle.  
The literature on welfare retrenchment has already grappled with the dynamics of this 
puzzle. This literature starts from the assumption that the electorate are more likely to 
punish governments for losses – such as benefit cutbacks – rather than reward them 
for providing gains such as lower taxes1 (Starke 2006, 106). Politicians are therefore 
chiefly motivated by a desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than to 
claim credit for popular ones. This was adapted by Paul Pierson (1994; 1996) to 
explain how the new politics of welfare retrenchment required political strategies in 
order to avoid blame. These include the strategy of ‘divide and conquer’: targeting 
cuts on weaker and less politically salient groups in order to assuage others. Posner 
and Blöndal (2012) extrapolate from this framework to suggest that fiscal 
consolidation is intrinsically unpopular due to the nature of ‘taking away’ benefits 
from voters. Wedge politics (Wilson and Turnbull 2001) effectively turns the blame-
avoiding assumption on its head, and instead hints at how fiscal consolidation can be, 
in effect, a credit-claiming strategy. By building on existing social cleavages to create 
crosscutting constituencies of ‘winners’, wedge politics targets already stigmatised 
social groups as a way of creating a common cause and link political opponents to 
their support of the ‘losers’ (Wilson and Turnbull 2001, 385). This article extends this 
research by examining micro-level dynamics of legitimation.  
The UK – the focus of this article – provides an illustrative case study in the 
legitimation of fiscal consolidation. The key economic priority of the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition government when formed in 2010 was to reduce the 
fiscal deficit (Hay 2013). Unlike in the Eurozone periphery, fiscal consolidation in the 
UK could not be justified as a response to the imperatives of an external market crisis 
(e.g. sharp rise in bond yields), nor is it the implementation of a strategy imposed by 
external actors (e.g. the IMF-EC-ECB Troika)2. Opinion polls have consistently 
shown that a ‘vast majority’ accepted the necessity and inevitability of significant cuts 
in public expenditure (Dorey 2010: 414), with ‘widespread agreement among elites 
and the public alike about what should be done’ (Whiteley et al. 2015, 5; see also 
Whiteley et al. 2013). In the absence of obvious external actors to displace blame on to, 
the UK case offers unique insights into the politics of fiscal consolidation – especially 
in regard to how such strategies are conferred a degree of legitimacy. 
                                                
1 Note the variation among cognate literatures in how the winners and losers from such reforms are 
discussed. The blame avoidance and welfare retrenchment literature typically writes of voter “losses” 
and “gains” (e.g. Weaver 1987, Pierson 1996), where as the political economy literature typically writes 
of redistributional effects. Although there are differences, this article uses the two vocabularies 
interchangeably.  
2 This did not stop the Coalition from drawing analogies with the Greek crisis. Regardless, in the UK 
case, fiscal consolidation appears as both a self-inflicted strategy to restructure the state itself, and a pre-
emptive strike to both bolster market credibility and generate economic governing competence. 
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In line with the need for a micro-level or everyday focus, this article draws on six focus 
group discussions conducted in the West Midlands in the UK between May and 
September 2012. The focus groups were comprised either of middle-income 
homeowners or community volunteers respectively, and these participants were 
invited to discuss politics and the economy in an age of austerity. In contrast to the 
rational actor with predictable preferences, this research foregrounds the shared 
practices and common stocks of knowledge, i.e. intersubjectivity (Bloor et al. 2001; 
Calder 1977). Drawing on this focus group data, the central argument is that fiscal 
consolidation speaks to real concerns citizens have over unfair redistribution to 
supposed ‘undeserving’ groups. As the data highlights, there was a consistent 
legitimacy gap between the participants’ prudent normative expectations about how 
redistribution ought to work, and – on the other hand – their actual lived experiences of 
profligacy in engaging with the uses and abuses of ‘taxpayers’ money’ and redistribution. 
Fiscal consolidation is consequently conferred a degree of legitimacy – especially if 
losses are seen as being imposed on those undeserving groups – by ostensibly making 
life fairer for ‘taxpayers’. This assists in illuminating the question of legitimation. 
However, the article does not treat ‘taxpayers’ as a pre-given constituency like voters, 
citizens or certain interest groups3. ‘The taxpayer’ is instead best understood as a sense 
of group position that arises from the everyday process of making sense of one’s own 
and others position in society and the wider fiscal order4 (Blumer 1958; Kidder and 
Martin 2012). This particular order consists of the hardworking taxpayers who pay 
their own way, and the undeserving poor and rich who take more than their fair share 
from the public purse. This order is normative inasmuch that it does not reflect or 
represent actual flows of (re)distribution. Instead it is based on shared values regarding 
how redistribution ought to work. Participants consistently identified themselves and 
their fellow participants within the taxpayer group, which was constructed in 
opposition a morally undeserving rich and poor5. The key distinction between the 
taxpaying and undeserving groups was the extent to which people make a ‘fair’ 
contribution to state revenues and the extent to which people strive to meet this 
normative goal. Consequently, there was a sense that ‘taxpayers’ money’ was unfairly 
                                                
3  It should be noted how this differs considerably from the assumptions about rational utility-
maximising actors that tends to underpins the economics literature and ideas on fiscal consolidation – 
including, notoriously, “reverse Ricardian equivalence” that was used by policymakers to justify 
austerity.  
4 One of the oddities of the taxpayer as a group identity is that everyone in the UK does, of course, pay 
tax in some form even if it is just via value-added tax (VAT) and only around 30% of total revenues are 
via income tax. For the purposes of this article, a taxpayer is defined as someone who believes they 
deserve to be the recipient of state spending due to some sense of collective ownership over public 
finances. We can identify two important sources of this sense of ownership. On the one hand, Laura 
Paler (2013) has shown that the sheer act of paying a highly visible tax leads citizens to gaining a sense 
of ownership over the public purse. On the other hand, this sense of ownership is also historically 
specific. Take, for example, the way in which the media typically divide the cost of public services by 
each household or taxpayer; for example, that each British household is paying, on average, £X in 
interest payments on public debt per year.  
5 Populations can of course consider different types of gains from tax and spending, but this article 
focuses on this one way.  
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redistributed to the undeserving poor (through welfare transfers for example) and the 
undeserving rich (through bank bailouts for example).  
This argument unfolds over three sections. The first section sets out the analytical 
framework and methodology. It outlines the two central concepts in the article: 
legitimacy gaps, and the taxpayer as a ‘sense of group position’. It then describes and 
justifies the focus group method. The second section analyses the focus group data. It 
is shown how focus group participants consistently identified themselves as 
hardworking taxpayers. The conclusion summarises the argument and then briefly 
highlights how this legitimacy gap may have been addressed through high-profile 
Coalition economic policy interventions.   
Analysing legitimacy gaps in state redistribution 
This section outlines the theory and methods of the article. The first part unpacks the 
two core conceptual frameworks used in the article – legitimacy gaps, and the 
taxpayer as a sense of group position – and contextualises them within the historical 
context of funding the state.  The second part discusses how the alignment of focus 
groups with the assumption of intersubjectivity is an appropriate methodology for 
researching these dynamics. The section ends by outlining the research design.  
Legitimacy gaps 
Modern liberal states are walking a never-ending tightrope when it comes to tax. For 
these states to exist and continue in their current form they must extract relatively 
large amounts of money and goods from their citizens and other taxpayers, which is 
then partly redistributed both directly and indirectly to others (Steinmo 1996, 1). 
While organising this extraction is itself an administrative challenge, the real difficulty 
perhaps lies in ensuring the legitimacy of fiscal relations so that taxpayers consent to 
this forceful extraction (O'Connor 1973, 6). The balancing act analogy is therefore 
appropriate, for if this fails then the wider legitimacy of the modern state is at stake 
too. Yet in contemporary Western states, this balancing act has been so successful that 
we rarely acknowledge it. Since it is largely taken for granted, the issue normally lies 
outside the purview of normal politics. Exceptional times, with politicised budget 
deficits and talk of necessary austerity, take these fiscal relations and the issues of tax 
and spending to the top of the political agenda. During these exceptional times, 
ensuring consent among taxpayers to these fiscal relations through legitimation 
strategies is paramount.  
Consent to fiscal relations, however, cannot be reduced to the aggregated cost-benefit 
analysis of individuals (e.g. Ross 2004). Since taxes are a set of ‘obligations to 
contribute money or goods to the state in exchange for nothing in particular’ (Martin et al. 
2009, 2, emphasis added) tax consent is far from black and white. It is virtually 
impossible for taxpayers to know what the public goods and services they benefit from, 
or indeed exactly how much tax they pay. For these reasons, there are number of 
biases. Public goods (such as pavements or the legal system) are typically taken for 
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granted because of negativity bias and loss aversion. These cognitive heuristics ensure 
that people tend to remember – and therefore form their ‘preferences’ on – negative 
experiences in which something beneficial is taken away rather than a time when 
something positive is provided (Weaver 1987). There is also an inevitable focus on the 
high profile and emotionally charged forms of direct redistribution, such as welfare 
benefits. Generally speaking, then, people make sense of whether they are getting a 
fair share of this pie through their everyday knowledge, experiences, and the media6 
(on which, see Gamson 1992). Understanding how reforms chime with a collective 
sense of fairness is therefore as instructive as an aggregated cost-benefit analysis of 
individual preferences.  
Leonard Seabrooke’s (2007) legitimacy gap concept captures these dynamics well. A 
legitimacy gap exists ‘when there is space between claims to fairness and rightfulness 
of policy actions by those governing, and the conferral of these claims evident in the 
expressive practices of the governed’ (Seabrooke 2007, 796). In other words, it is a gap 
between expectations and what is experienced as delivered, to the extent that it can be 
considered unjust in line with shared values7 (Beetham 1991, 6-19). Governments may 
intervene with policies that seek to assuage these gaps – by promising to make the 
economy fairer in line with expectations that can be justified by shared values – and 
therefore halt the erosion of their legitimation. Legitimacy gaps, then, are driven by 
conflicts over how the economy ought to work.  
Since the fiscal deficit is a central symbol in the battle over austerity in the UK – itself 
an intensely political marker of crisis that must be seen within historical shifts in the 
organisation of state power (Sinclair 2000) – the sustainability of public spending has 
become politicized (Stanley 2014a). Conflicts over the uses and abuses of ‘taxpayers’ 
money’ have come to the fore, with concerns over seemingly unfair redistribution to 
those deemed undeserving of it particularly prominent.  There is a sense that certain 
social groups – say the undeserving poor or rich – take more than their fair share from 
the public purse. From this process a legitimacy gap may emerge, since these lived 
experiences do not match up with shared values about how redistribution ought to 
work. 
                                                
6 Gamson concludes – perhaps surprisingly for a scholar who made his name in analysing the power of 
media discourses – that the media is not the most important resource but is roughly equal among three. 
Unfortunately, due to limitations in space and resources, it was only possible to incorporate two from 
three of Gamson’s sense-making triumvirate. Although the role of the media in disseminating 
information is undoubtedly crucial, it should be remembered that legitimation cannot be reduced to the 
internalisation of an elite-driven narrative (on which, see Beetham 1991: 106).  
7 Ted Hopf (2002), who used focus groups to analyse the politics of post-communist transition, provides 
an illuminating distinction between whether political change is “legitimised” or “naturalised”. 
Naturalisation occurs when a population’s acceptance of a regime and its politics is borne from an 
“unthinkability” of any alternatives (Hopf 2002: 403) but legitimation occurs if changes can be fully 
justified in an open and pluralist discussion. Given the nature of the focus group discussions, it would be 
implausible to argue that austerity was naturalised rather than legitimated.  
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The taxpayer as a sense of group position 
Herbert Blumer’s sense of group position theory can help in analysing these dynamics. 
Blumer’s key insight is that ‘social life depends on the working-out of an abstract, but 
stable and shared, image of the world’ (Kidder and Martin 2012, 125). Blumer argued 
that race prejudice, for example, was experienced as a sense of group position rather 
than a set of individual feelings that members may have for those in another group 
(1958, 3). This meant recasting racism as a sociological process of group formation 
rather than as a psychological problem (1958, 3). There are two important features for 
our purposes. First, to characterise another group is also to define one’s own group 
(1958, 4). A sense of group position emerges from this necessarily relational experience 
(1958, 4). The resulting order, however, is not intended to reflect the ‘objective 
relations’ between groups, rather ‘it stands for ‘what ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’ 
… it is a sense of where the two groups belong’ (1958, 5). Second, this order is 
necessarily abstract because the groups are defined as an entity or whole (1958, 6). This 
is important, for it suggests that these relations take place in ‘the area of the remote 
and not of the near … it is not the experience with concrete individuals in daily 
association that gives rise to the definitions of the extended, abstract group’ (1958, 6).  
Kidder and Martin (2012) use this theory to show how the taxpayer can be 
understood not merely as a person who contributes to state revenues, but as a specific 
sense of group position constituted in opposition to undeserving others. Their interview 
participants typically categorised themselves as an abstract category of person, ‘the 
taxpayer’: virtuous, hard-working citizens who were contrasted against undeserving 
poor (2012, 126). ‘Without exception’, Kidder and Martin explain, the participants 
‘saw themselves in the former group, and they asserted the moral principle that those 
who have worked for their money should be rewarded and their efforts protected from 
idlers’ (2012, 126). Those ‘idlers’ were often characterised through stereotypes, such as 
welfare cheats and fat-cat bankers (2012, 126). In producing this sense of group 
position, the participants portrayed tax as depriving hardworking taxpayers and 
therefore as a threat to the moral order (2012, 124). This qualitative work reflects 
quantitative studies that show the pervasiveness and persistence of an ‘deservingness 
heuristic’ in both Europe and the US (Van Oorschot 2000; Aarøe and Petersen 2014). 
To summarise thus far: in lieu of perfect information about tax and spending, people 
use different cultural and social resources to make sense of whether they are getting 
value for money from the state. One way people make sense of whether their lived 
experience of tax and spending matches shared normative expectations is through 
assessing the deservingness of others. Abstract categories of people are either deemed 
deserving and hardworking and therefore included within the hardworking taxpayer 
group, or they are deemed undeserving and therefore excluded from that group and 
subsequently stigmatised. The taxpayer is therefore best understood as a sense of 
group position rather than an identity or interest group. These group dynamics are 
not directly linked to the level of taxation paid, but rather are a product of social 
conflict over how redistribution ought to work. This is one example in which a 
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legitimacy gap – between the experiences and expectations of redistribution – may 
widen. By intervening on behalf of ‘taxpayers’ to close that gap and therefore uphold 
the way society ought to be ordered, states may receive legitimation for otherwise 
unpopular fiscal consolidation.  
Focus groups and the study of intersubjectivity 
This theory of legitimacy gaps in state redistribution is underpinned by the 
assumption of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity ‘refers to the common-sense 
conceptions and ordinary explanations shared by a set of social actors … [It] is thus 
defined socially, not individually’ (1977, 358). This contrasts with the rational choice 
assumptions made by the literature on welfare retrenchment and blame avoidance 
whereby the interests of different constituencies can be mapped based on aggregated 
individual interests. However, a sense group position, such as ‘the taxpayer’, cannot 
be readily reduced to material interests because they arise from conflicts over 
redistribution ought to work. These dynamics can be foregrounded by instead making 
the assumption of intersubjectivity. 
Qualitative methods are a natural fit with this assumption. Justifications and the 
process of identification can be seen and heard first-hand through interviewing people. 
Focus groups are a form of qualitative interview that have a particular advantage for 
our purposes here because they generate data on the process of collective meaning 
making. As Michael Bloor and his co-authors point out, focus groups ‘generate data 
on the group meanings that lie behind such collective assessments, on the group 
processes that lead to such assessments, and on the normative understandings that 
groups draw upon to reach such assessments’ (2001, 17). Consequently, focus groups 
are not seen as a way of ‘mining’ objective beliefs lodged in the minds of individuals 
(Kvale and Brinkmann 2009, 48-9), but rather as a way of revealing previously taken 
for granted assumptions that underpin our rarely articulated but common sense stock 
of knowledge (Bloor et al. 2001, 5). This typically occurs not through systematic 
question and answering but through encouraging ‘sociable public discourse’ (Gamson 
1992, 19) or ‘retrospective introspection’ (Bloor et al. 2001, 5) in which the researcher 
guides and facilitates discussion.  
This intersubjective foundation has important implications for sampling. The degree 
to which people share similar cultural artefacts is closely related to common patterns 
of socialisation: ‘The key variable is the degree of personal contact and similarity of 
socialisation, which is basic to all social groupings’ (Calder 1977, 358). Focus groups 
should therefore consist of participants who have a lot in common. This is indeed why 
the classic focus group literature consistently recommends using homogenous 
participants (Morgan 1997, 35; Krueger and Casey 2000, 10; Wilkinson 2004, 179). If 
specific sub-groups are the most methodologically consistent, then it also makes sense 
to sample theoretically: that is, ‘theorising – albeit at an early stage – about the 
dimensions that are likely to be relevant in terms of giving rise to differing perceptions 
or experiences’ (Barbour 2007, 58). For this reason, homeowners from middle-income 
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areas were selected as a theoretically likely group to justify austerity8, while volunteers 
in impoverished areas were selected as a theoretically likely group to oppose austerity. 
Middle-income homeowners also have the advantage of corresponding closely to 
‘Middle England’, a key electoral constituency that politicians are said to target with 
policies and rhetoric (Watson 2009; Holland 2011). This research design provides 
scope for analytical generality of findings9. 
Six focus groups, with a total of 39 participants, were conducted between May and 
October 2012 (see appendix for details). The first sub-group was recruited via the 
electoral register, while the second sub-group was recruited via local advertisements 
and word of mouth. All participants were offered a £20 gift voucher as an incentive. 
The groups contained a mix of those employed in the public and private sectors – as 
well as unemployed – and a mix of genders and ethnicities. A limited facilitation 
approach taken by the author, meaning that questions and interventions were limited 
to allow the discussion to flow relatively freely. Towards the end of each group it was 
always asked whether they believe austerity is necessary. Each discussion was recorded 
and transcribed verbatim. Analysis was conducted in NVivo, and illuminating and 
paradigmatic examples from this are used to illustrate the analysis below. The next 
section moves on to using this focus group data as the foundation for analysis.   
Taxpayers vs. the undeserving poor and rich 
Cailtin: I think we’ve got too much debt. And the cuts are being made in … 
for normal … normal? [‘The average?’] Yeah the average person. And 
personally, I think it always hits the middle-income families. Always. Because 
you’re either up there with your £29m bonus, or you’re down there and you 
do get help – I’m not saying everyone – but you do get a lot of benefits and 
help. But if you’re in this middle bit, you don’t quite get your child benefit, you 
don’t quite get help with your university fees, you don’t get that… 
 [Focus group A4] 
Rose: You’ve got to have a bit of incentive. Its no good … it’s a shame, 
because it’s the middle people who do out go and get the work, and I’m not 
saying that people are unemployed because they want to be, but what I’m 
saying is that there is a big sector of people who are in the middle – like I was a 
single-parent once, working. I was worse off than some single parents, not 
                                                
8 This targeted sub-group of homogenous participants was selected as “middle-income homeowners” in 
order to get a balance between breadth and specificity, and within the available resources for research. 
As such, it would then be methodologically inconsistent to sub-sample, say, public-sector workers 
without designating them as a sub-group in their own right – as this would violate the assumption of 
intersubjectivity that underpins the research design.  
9 It is important to note the differences between empirical generalisability and analytical generality. 
Neopositivist research will typically use empirical generalisability to “scale up” a series of individual 
preferences from a representative sample in order to make claims about a wider population. Since the 
level of analysis in this alternative methodology is not the individual, a different method is required 
based on the logical or analytical generality of ideal-typical patterns (on which, see Stanley 2014b, 110-128). 
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working. So where is my incentive? And then you’ve got families where it’s my 
husband is working but I’m not at the moment. We struggle. 
 [Focus group B1] 
As the above epigrams from the focus groups highlight, in identifying groups that 
unfairly benefit from current fiscal relations, a sense of group position was produced. 
In the middle of this order lie hardworking taxpayers, whose taxes go to support the 
undeserving poor but also, in the current political climate, the undeserving rich – 
politicians who fiddle expenses and bailed out bankers. This sense of group position 
was often produced when participants made wider points about the ‘squeezed middle’ 
and the unfairness of current economic and fiscal relations, therefore suggesting a 
legitimacy gap in state redistribution.  
The dynamics at the heart of this sense of group position have parallels with a number 
of British societal trends identified in other scholarly work. Despite widespread 
evidence of income and wealth inequality widening (Piketty and Zucman 2014), the 
idea that British society is mostly classless with the exception of morally questionable 
outliers at both the top and bottom is increasingly widespread. New Labour stoked 
this idea of a classless society. Ruth Levitas (1998) argues that New Labour moved 
away from a view of social exclusion as intertwined with material poverty, and instead 
towards a view that distinguishes between those who are socially integrated (mostly in 
terms of labour market attachment and employment) and those who are excluded as a 
‘moral underclass’. Contemporary sociology research has shown how those stuck in a 
low-pay-no-pay cycle – i.e. those who may have first hand experiences of being 
impoverished – were keen to dissociate from the ‘undeserving poor’ (Shildrick and 
MacDonald 2013). In the process these people denounced their own poverty, since 
that term has become associated with stigma and shame.  
Peter Taylor-Gooby (2013) has used the British Social Attitudes survey to demonstrate 
how these trends are reflected in public opinion. Overall, he shows how most people 
are clearly less likely to support the state in redistribution or tackling poverty with the 
use of public finances. While support for higher spending on the poor peaked in 1989, 
the general trend since then has been clearly downwards (2013, 35). Meanwhile, the 
percentage of respondents agreeing that government should ‘spend more … on the 
poor, even if it leads to higher taxes’ has steadily declined from over half in 1993 to 
around a quarter in 2009 (2013, 34). Most interestingly, the number of people who 
believed benefits were too high more than doubled during the lifetime of the New 
Labour government, from around 30 to 60 percent (2013, 35). We can speculate on 
the relationship between this increase and shifts in the governing practices of New 
Labour, in which the moral underclass discourse was matched with an ‘increasingly 
authoritarian position on welfare dependency’ in which ‘the reduced burden on the 
taxpayer of social assistance’ was consistently highlighted (Watson 2013a, 11).  
The sense that there is an undeserving rich who are – paradoxically perhaps – also 
receiving unfair redistribution has been forged in part by recent events. In particular 
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the bank bailouts following the global financial crisis and the MPs’ expenses scandal 
created much ire because of the role of ‘taxpayers’ money’ in supporting elite social 
groups. We will now look at how this sense of group position was produced in the 
focus group discussions, by looking at each constituent social group represented in this 
normative order.  
The undeserving poor 
The discussion about the undeserving poor was not explicit. The subtext for these 
sorts of discussions, which evaluated the fairness of different groups contributions to 
society, was unmistakably fiscal. If there are people out there living off welfare benefits, 
the logic goes, then ‘the taxpayer’ must be paying for it. That is money that could 
otherwise line of the pockets of the ‘squeezed middle’ and give ‘hardworking families’ 
a boost in securing their own life chances. A moral distinction between the taxpayer 
and a morally undeserving other is required to fulfil this logic. This process is 
apparent in this excerpt: 
Rose: … I bring up my kids not to do that. Why should they get away with it? 
When people are doing wrong and blaming the society, then getting away with 
it. Why do they get a hand? Why is it the guilty people who get the goodies, 
and the innocent people who get punished all the time? And a bit more took 
off them? It’s not right. If you’re in prison, you get free education, free TV, 
free hair, free everything. You can get a degree in prison! It don’t cost you 9 
grand! And they’ll pay you while you’re in there, so you come out with a little 
bit of money.  
 [Focus group B1] 
Some participants contested the moral abstract order, by pointing attention to how 
‘there isn’t much incentive for people to actually, sort of, get up and get on and feel 
that it is worthwhile for them really’ (Cailtin, focus group A4). However, it becomes 
clear from the assumptions underpinning more detailed discussions that the perverse 
incentives of the welfare state are not an excuse for not contributing:  
Michael: But you do get this stereotype, and you think well … if they can get 
more money sitting on their backsides on welfare or whatever they get, then 
you can’t blame them, but they haven’t got that inbuilt is it … pride? That you 
have to go and work for a living – do anything, rather than be on the dole… 
 [Focus group A4] 
The subtext to comments such as this is that while incentives are an important factor, 
people of the correct moral fibre have the personal strength, will power and dignity to 
avoid these lifestyles.  
When the undeserving poor were the focus of discussions, the stereotype of the 
scrounger tended to be contested. Typically, a participant would respond to these 
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stereotypes by appealing instead to the structural impediments facing the unemployed. 
For instance: 
Lynn: [inaudible] There’s no work, the jobs, and especially with working with 
[inaudible] in the area, you find that … 
Rose: There’s nothing around 
Lynn: There’s this perception of young people that they’re lazy and they 
don’t actually want to go to work so they’re on benefits, but actually, through 
my role in my job and through meeting people around you see that there are a 
lot of good kids out there who do actually want to work and there is just 
nothing out there. 
 [Focus group B1] 
Caitlin: Problem is that there is no jobs. The government are on the one 
hand saying oh we’re going to cut benefits and you’ve got to get a job, and on 
the other there are no jobs! So… 
 [Focus group A4] 
This is perhaps unsurprising given the focus groups are a social situation in which the 
participants were unfamiliar with their fellow discussants. The representation of the 
undeserving poor cannot be appreciated until we look at how people tended to place 
themselves within the ‘the taxpayer’ group, which as suggested requires an ‘other’. 
This is considered below, after analysing how the focus groups discussed the 
undeserving rich.  
The undeserving rich 
The undeserving rich typically consisted of two groups: bankers and politicians. 
Although these two groups might not usually be categorised together, there were three 
elements that they both shared as evident in the focus group discussions: crisis 
culpability, otherworldliness, and redistribution. The first of these themes – culpability 
for causing the crisis or crises of 2008 and beyond – is the most straightforward to 
outline. For instance, Damien [focus group A1] captured the mood in arguing that 
regardless of political allegiances ‘the politicians have to take a big responsibility for 
not taking … for not foreseeing the possibilities of the collapse’. Equally, bankers were 
blamed for the crisis too. For instance, preceding a lengthy discussion in which a 
consensus of sorts was built, Nicholas [focus group A2] is clear on this topic: ‘That, 
given the way you ask the question [‘who or what is to blame?’], who do we blame for 
it […] forgive me [Duncan, who works for a bank], but I think the level you possibly 
point at is the banks’.  
Depicting bankers and politicians as living in another world – i.e. otherworldliness – 
was the second key element that united the undeserving rich category. Although 
numerous examples were provided of how both politicians and bankers tended to be 
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unjustly enumerated, it was particularly notable how they were united their 
otherworldliness. As Maureen [focus group A1] put it: ‘I think they’re flying round the 
world … I don’t think they live in the same world as us’. It gave the sense that they 
were distant and living in a different world, or in a ‘bubble’ as one participant put it 
[Linda, Focus group B1]. This otherworldliness when combined with crisis culpability 
sometimes led to explicit moral judgments: 
Damien: I think there’s a moral, sort of, vacuum at the top. As to how to 
resolve that, I don’t have an answer to that. But I do think that the politicians 
and bankers must suffer from a guilt complex of some kind. 
  [Focus group A1] 
This sense of otherworldliness and distance is a crucial lubricant in the wheels of 
group position formation (Blumer 1958). 
The third theme of redistribution is perhaps the most important. When discussing the 
fairness of tax and spending it is normally welfare and the poor that are invoked. Two 
events are crucial in understanding the link between redistribution and the 
undeserving rich: the MP’s expenses scandal and the bailout of the financial sector. 
The former of these events occurred when British newspaper The Telegraph revealed 
abuse of the parliamentary expenses system by MPs. This had a considerable impact 
upon British politics, with Flinders (2012) convincingly arguing that a moral panic 
ensued in which politicians were cast as folk devils. These events were referenced in 
the focus group discussions:  
Michael: But you just think, Christ. How can these people be allowed… I 
think ever since the whole expenses scandal there’s been a massive backlash 
and there still is … Ridiculous. Imagine fleecing the people who put you in 
power.  
 [Focus group A4] 
The sense that taxpayers were cheated was most explicit when Rose [Focus group B1] 
compared the expenses scandals to those who fraudulently claim welfare benefits. 
Bank bailouts are the key event that makes categorising bankers as the unjust 
recipients of state redistribution possible. The following except highlights this, in 
particular how a small minority of undeserving rich people have benefitted from the 
perverse redistribution of income from the middle: 
Jerry: …nothing quite gets me as angry about thinking about just how lightly 
the sort of top 5% have actually got off so far in this, with this recession. I … 
y’know … it’s such a cliché, but you also feel like saying, it just has to be true, 
about how, y’know, bankers have moved to protect themselves and we’ve all 
paid for it. The whole financial sector, y’know, it’s terrifically … it makes me 
angry, and feel powerless as well. 
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 [Focus group A1] 
Sometimes these discussions explicitly linked bank bailouts, taxpayers’ money, and 
austerity (the discussion was preceded by questioning why the UK has so much debt): 
Kyle: …with Northern Rock you had people queuing outside of Northern 
Rock, we took a slightly different view and we sort of spent all of our money 
on it [laughter].  
Nicholas: And they’re still doing so. 
 [Focus group A2]  
However, it should also be noted that on some occasions participants told others how 
they believe bank bailouts were a necessary move to shore up the economy [e.g. Lynn, 
Focus group B1].  
The taxpayer 
The ‘us’ to the undeserving ‘them’ is ‘the taxpayer’. To quote Rose [Focus group B1], 
‘We pay the highest taxes in the world. Why haven’t we got any money left?’ This 
sense of group position – a mass of hard-working taxpayers, contrasted against a free-
riding super-rich and poor – leads to a legitimacy gap: The bottom cannot pay, the 
top find loopholes; the middle thus over-contributes, while receiving less bang for their 
buck: 
Kyle: But it is true though, isn’t it? You can only squeeze out Middle England 
so much, because they’re the ones who are paying it. ‘Cos the bottom don’t 
pay it, and the top… find … 
Linda: …clever ways round it. 
 [Focus group A2] 
But before exploring this fully, a quick note about the characteristics of this group 
position is required.  
Identity formation is normally constituted in opposition to an ‘other’. The sense of a 
morally undeserving rich, in this case, provides the basis for an opposing hardworking 
‘us’: 
Michael: It’s hard, sometimes, but other times, it’s absolutely simple. They 
[politicians] just… deserve everything [i.e. criticism] they get really. And I 
think that [MPs expenses] probably has a bigger impact upon anything we’ve 
seen in society recently. There’s a two-tier system, those that have, and those 
that work hard. Maybe. 
 [Focus group A4] 
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Michael returns to this theme of ‘haves and have-nots’ in making a more explicitly 
relevant point about how the ‘middle’ are being squeezed because they are the ones 
who are morally sound: 
Michael: I think you hit the nail on the head – it’s the middle ground that are 
squeezed. And those people – us, maybe – fit into the middle ground. Who 
will take the time to do that, who will do what we’re told, because we respect 
authority and we think if we don’t fill these forms in something bad will 
happen. But there are people out there who don’t, and they exploit the system 
completely, and I think there’s very much this society has changed a little bit.  
 [Focus group A4] 
In both the previous and the following excerpt, it is interesting to note that when this 
abstract order was discussed, participants were keen to include the other participants 
in the ‘us’: 
Nicholas: But I think that … when people introduced themselves, and [Kyle], 
you’re self-employed, I’m self-employed, [Duncan], you obviously get up and 
go out for a living – I sell used cars. I used to sell expensive motor cars…’ 
 [Focus group A2] 
Nicholas then goes onto outline how through graft and craft he realigned his business 
model to changing market conditions to ensure he still made money. The point this 
anecdote was to highlight how it was these people – ‘60 million people living in this 
country, and everyone morning they get up: They’ve got to eat; they’ve got to buy 
clothes; they go to work; and they’re all spending money’, i.e. the hardworking 
taxpayer – are the ones being ‘squeezed’. It is notable how broad this abstract group 
of people are, and also how Nicholas was keen to emphasise that all participants in 
that focus group discussion were members – suggesting that inclusion is highly valued. 
The notion of a middle mass being ‘squeezed’ in these hard times is crucial. This sense 
can be best understood through fiscal relations: the middle is not sufficiently rewarded 
for contributing to society and essentially supporting others; it is all ‘take, take, take’ 
[Caitlin, Focus group A4]:  
Caitlin: And you do get a bit resentful. I’m standing out here in the cold 
selling all this, and all my income tax is just going to someone who doesn’t 
want to work, someone who is just sitting at home and going off on a holiday 
to Mallorca for 2 weeks. And I’ve stood out in the cold funding their holiday in 
the sun. And you do sort of get a bit… 
Michael: And they think it’s their right, rather than the… 
Caitlin: But perhaps there is no incentive for them to get up and … do … as 
you say, it’s easier to do that, and if you’re of that way then… 
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 [Focus group A4] 
However, the most explicit expression of this sense of group position in an explicitly 
fiscal sense is from Kyle: 
Kyle: … and so you can’t get it [tax to finance the fiscal deficit] off these guys 
because they [inaudible] or they’ll find a way of being in the Channel islands 
or wherever it might be, and you’re not going to get if off the people at the 
bottom, because we don’t ask for it half the time but we’re certainly not going 
to get it from the bottom end, so it is Middle England who are having to pay 
more and more. And everybody, most British people, aspire to be moving up 
and up and up, the aspiration is that you get up there and then you’re back 
down here again, and you’re back up there and the next thing you know 
you’re back down. How do you do it? And we all struggle with that I think. 
 [Focus group A2] 
It should be noted, however, the moral abstract order did not always directly lead to 
tax resistance. In another instance, it led to an argument that the deficit should be 
made up by taxing big corporations who do not make a fair contribution: 
Lucy: And I think the money should be found – tried to be found – from 
elsewhere. And I don’t think it should be found by taxing – obviously I don’t 
think it should be found by taxing people like me – [inaudible] […] there are 
bigger targets to aim at. 
 [Focus group A3] 
However, despite this variation – ‘tax the mega-rich’ – both the group position and 
the justification of austerity are both still produced.  
Conclusion 
When ostensibly imposing losses on domestic populations via tax rises and spending 
cuts, how is fiscal consolidation legitimated? By exploring how members of the British 
public make sense of the turn to austerity, this contributes a micro-level and partial 
analysis of how fiscal consolidation can be conferred a degree of legitimacy. Fiscal 
consolidation chimes with the shared values of a self-identifying hardworking taxpayer 
group – thereby appearing to close a legitimacy gap between the experiences and 
expectations of this group. The argument has two parts.   
First, focus group participants consistently placed themselves within a moral abstract 
order when making sense of austerity. A morally undeserving rich and poor was 
deemed to be receiving an unjust proportion of public goods. The participants almost 
exclusively identified against these undeserving traits, and thus occupied a large 
middle ground in between these two positions by asserting their own hard-working 
virtues. This process helped form ‘the taxpayer’ as a sense of group position. The 
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potency of the group position is found in its moral, rather than socioeconomic, 
foundations. Due to the nature of distinction in the order – which is not about poverty 
or wealth per se but rather whether one seeks to work hard and better themselves – 
almost everybody would identify as a part of it. It is in this sense vehemently inclusive. 
Few people would happily self-identify either as a welfare scrounger or as a corrupt 
elite.    
Second, when this group position is produced, a legitimacy gap over redistribution 
emerges. This is a gap between what is experienced as delivered and what is deemed 
fair in line with shared values. In other words, there was a consistent gap between the 
participants’ prudent normative expectations about how redistribution ought to work, and – 
on the other hand – their actual lived experiences of profligacy in engaging with the uses 
and abuses of ‘taxpayers’ money’. Simply put, if one believes the undeserving are 
receiving an unjust level of public goods, then one will question the fairness of 
contributing towards that from ones own pockets. The existence of this legitimacy gap 
suggests that sections of the British public were responsive to a state strategy that seeks 
to trim back the state, lessen the burden of taxation, and reorientate redistribution in 
line with how it ought to work – or, perhaps more accurately, who it ought to work for. 
The article therefore offers a partial explanation of how fiscal consolidation can be 
conferred a degree of legitimacy.  
The focus group participants are not alone in invoking deservingness when talking 
about austerity. After all, the sight of politicians claiming to reward ‘hardworking 
families’ over the interests of other groups has become commonplace over the last few 
decades. It is interesting to note how some of the more high-profile austerity-era 
policies of the Coalition government have seemingly spoken to the concerns of ‘the 
taxpayer’. Although almost all government departments have been forced to 
significantly cut their budgets, the attempted reform of welfare has been the most high 
profile.  
Although many of the changes are essentially piecemeal in nature, the Coalition 
government’s welfare retrenchment program will make the lives of Britain’s poorest 
worse (Taylor-Gooby 2012, 64). Changes to the Working Tax Credit will impact 
disproportionately upon women by privileging a traditional single earner model in 
middle-income families (MacLeavy 2011, 356), meanwhile the ‘bedroom tax’ will 
disproportionately impact upon those who are disabled (Meers 2014). Although the 
composition of fiscal consolidation has focussed on expenditure rather than revenue, 
there have also been high profile attempts at tackling tax evasion and avoidance. 
Although not as high profile as welfare reforms, this rise is noticeable due to previous 
sacrosanct nature of tackling the wealthy – but this shift may be best explained by 
changes in the international sphere (Hakelberg 2014) rather than a deliberate 
domestic strategy. Nevertheless, appeals to tax evasion and avoidance have been 
surprisingly prominent in elite justifications for fiscal consolidation. On the other hand, 
other policies have sought to improve the life chances of (and win votes from) 
‘hardworking families’. Most notably, these include the first-time homeowner ‘Right 
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to Buy’ scheme, pension annuity reform, the NHS ‘ring fence’, and, in the run up to 
the 2015 election, the Conservative pledge to introduce a legally sanctioned ‘tax lock’ 
that prevents any increases in income tax.  
Whether these interventions have adequately helped close any gap between prudent 
normative expectations and lived experiences of profligacy is difficult to gauge. Based 
on the analysis in this article, we can speculate the following: these interventions may 
generate a degree of legitimacy for fiscal consolidation by seemingly improving ‘the 
taxpayers’ lot through ensuring that both the undeserving poor and rich are seen to 
make a fair and even contribution to the pool of public goods. This is one way of 
explaining the puzzle of why fiscal relations have been conferred legitimacy despite 
the promise of tax rises and spending cuts for all.  
Rather than Pierson’s ‘divide and conquer’ strategy, whereby existing social conflicts 
over resources are used to play off constituencies against one another in order to avoid 
blame, this legitimation strategy is perhaps best characterised as a form of credit-claiming 
‘wedge politics’. Both strategies involve rewarding salient constituencies while 
imposing losses on others to reduce the political dangers of fiscal consolidation. Yet, 
while dividing and conquering is built on more traditional forms of social conflict – 
capital vs. labour (Gourevitch 1986), or between well-entrenched interest groups 
(Pierson 1996, 144) – ‘wedge politics’ involves conflict of a different sort. Rather than 
reducible to one’s structural position in the economy, conflict within this particular 
case centres on meaning; specifically, what it means to be a taxpayer and therefore 
claim some sort of ownership over ‘taxpayers’ money’. As it turns out, what it means 
to be a taxpayer is not necessarily reducible to flows of revenue but is imbued within 
(i) the everyday process of making sense of one’s place in society in relation to others 
and (ii) judgements about the deservingness of those other groups.  By intervening on 
behalf of ‘taxpayers’, the government can in effect claim credit for fiscal consolidation, 
rather than bury it in risky and obfuscating blame avoidance strategies. 
This contributes to existing literature on the post-2008 turn to fiscal consolidation, 
which tends to focus on macroeconomic and democratic implications and can 
sometimes categorise ‘austerity’ as an issue of just state expenditure. When 
expenditure is rightly put in context of revenue it is typically done on a macro-level 
(Streeck 2014), whereby micro-level or everyday issues of legitimation are sidelined. A 
‘fiscal sociological’ perspective – whether explicitly framed as so (e.g. Martin et al. 
2009) or, as it is in this article, done implicitly (e.g. Watson 2013b) – can bring these 
relations to the fore. The politics of taxing and spending – and their relation to one 
another on both macro and micro levels – is what lies at the heart of the politics of 
austerity. 
It is important to appreciate the idiosyncrasy and context of the British case examined 
here. Although the ‘deservingness heuristic’ is an established empirical fact across a 
range of Western societies (Aarøe and Petersen 2014), the UK has a well-embedded 
history of individualism that was further reinforced by the economic reforms of the 
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1980s and beyond. The sense of group position is in many ways ideological in nature 
– in the sense that it is a way of being that if accepted systematically favour the 
interests of a dominant social group over another. That this sense of group position 
does not correspond to the flows of redistribution is not a meaningful critique for the 
emergence of ‘the taxpayer’ group position seen in the data. In contrast, historicising 
these relations – in particular, the emergence of ‘the taxpayer’ and of ‘taxpayers’ 
money’ – to understand their political and social sources is of the highest importance. 
However, the way in which Coalition politicians have drawn upon this is a different 
matter. Justifying the restructuring of the state and the imposition of consequent losses 
on the poor in the name of ‘hardworking families’ and ‘the taxpayer’ is cynical politics 
of the highest order – even if it does resonate with shared values over how 
redistribution ought to work.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Focus groups details 
Nam
e 
Date No. of 
participant
s 
Location, all in West 
Midlands (with 
postcode) 
Average 
property 
valuei 
A1 May 2012 6 Kings Heath (B14) £147,147 
A2 June 2012 4 Sutton Coldfield (B72) £241,081 
A3 July 2012 3 Solihull (B90) £226,423 
A4 July 2012 3 Moseley (B13) £210,109 
A5 September 2012 10 Aston (B6) £89,433  
A6 October 2012 10 Shard End (B33) £109,315 
 
Table A2. Description of focus group participants 
Focus group A1. Kings Heath, Birmingham, May 2012. 
Nameii  Age  Occupation 
Paul  51  Agricultural researcher 
Damien  47  English tutor 
Denise  52  Teaching assistant 
Maureen  52  Unemployed 
Waheed  52  Unknown 
Jerry  50  NHS manager 
Focus group A2. Sutton Coldfield, Birmingham, June 2012. 
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Name  Age  Occupation 
Duncan  46  Banker 
Kyle  50  Driving instructor 
Linda  56  Housewife 
Nicholas  51  Car trader 
Focus group A3. Solihull, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Sarah  52  Child-minder 
Lucy  50  Part time sixth form lecturer / carer 
Rachel  51  IT support at local college 
Focus group A4. Moseley, Birmingham, July 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Caitlin  48  Part time researcher and craftsperson 
Mandy  60  Retired teacher 
Michael  38  Broadcast journalist 
Focus group B5. Aston, Birmingham, September 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Lynn  46  Community organizer 
Felix  36  Unemployed / volunteer 
Jo  20  Volunteer 
Rose  42  Volunteer 
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Linda  N/A  Unknown 
Shauna  40  Events / community work 
Eric  58  Unknown 
Poonam  N/A  Retired 
Beemal  34  Unknown 
Jill  27  Mother 
Focus group B6. Shard End, Birmingham, October 2012. 
Name  Age  Occupation 
Joanna  N/A  Unknown 
Louise  37  Unknown 
May  46  Care worker 
Jamie  18  College student 
Yangun  18  Retail assistant 
Jilly  30  Unknown 
Joiii  20  Volunteer 
Clare  N/A  Volunteer 
Mary  77  Retired 
Nicola  18  Student 
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